Introduction
Starting in 2001 and continuing for several years, most states faced very severe fiscal crises characterized by large and repeated budget gaps between available revenues and the resources needed to maintain government programs. Unlike prior fiscal crises, state governments responded to these budgetary gaps with more spending cuts rather than tax increases. In a majority of states, declines in grants to their local governments played an important role in filling these budget gaps (Reschovsky, 2004; Kalambokidis and Reschovsky, 2005) . Local governments in turn could respond to reduced state fiscal assistance by increasing locally-raised revenues, which in most states means the property tax. Census data indicate that between 2000 and 2004 (the fiscal year of the latest available data), changes in per capita property tax revenue have varied tremendously across the states. This paper will explore whether states used the property tax as a way of maintaining the level of public services in light of large cuts in state intergovernmental grants. That is, we will examine whether the property tax played an important countercyclical role in maintaining the stability of the state-local sector.
State Government Fiscal Crises
By historical standards, the recession that started in 2001 was very mild. After a brief dip, real GDP continued to grow. As in every recession, real state government tax revenues declined in most states. Thus, it is not surprising that real per capita state tax revenue was lower in 2002 than it was in 2000 in 44 states.
1 What distinguished this recession from previous ones, and led scholars to conclude that the fiscal crises faced by most states were probably the worst since the Great Depression, was that the magnitude of the decline in state revenue and the fact that 1 This calculation is based on tax revenue data from the U.S. Bureau of the Census (various years) and Consumer Price Index data from the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics (2007) . The six states in which real per capita tax revenue grew during this period were Arkansas, New Hampshire, Louisiana, South Dakota, West Virginia, and Wyoming.
revenue continued to stagnate for a longer than normal period after the overall economy started to recover (Knight, Kusko, and Rubin, 2003 states, with total revenue declining by 3.8 percent over this four year period.
One way to illustrate the severity of the fiscal crises faced by many states over the past few years is to compare real GDP growth with real growth in state tax revenue after netting out the revenue impact of any legislated changes in taxes since the first quarter of 2001. Figure 1 demonstrates the impact on state tax revenue of the slow economic recovery and highlights the structural problems that characterize many state tax systems, in particular their revenue inelasticity. 2 The data show that about two years after the recession, adjusted real state tax revenues had dropped by about 12 percent from their level in early 2001. Furthermore, as recently as the end of the third quarter of 2006, real adjusted state tax revenue has not regained its pre-recession level.
How State Governments Responded to Fiscal Crises
In fiscal years 2002 through 2004 most state governments faced a series of large budget gaps. Given the balanced budget requirements that nearly all states face, state governments had to either raise revenues through legislated increases in taxes or fees, cut expenditures, or exploit various one-time funding measures. Although a number of states did resort to tax increases, Maag and Merriman (2003) demonstrate that in general states increased taxes by much less than they had after the 1990-91 recession. As a consequence, many state governments were forced to In this paper, we attempt to test the hypothesis that local governments will respond to cuts in state grants by raising local property taxes rather than cutting services. We focus on the property tax because it is the single most important source of local government tax revenue. In the case of local school districts, the type of local government that bore the brunt to most of the aid cuts, property taxes account for 96.7 percent of total tax revenue raised. The data in Figures 2 and 3, show that property tax revenues were increasing over the past few years. But as the property tax is for the most part a local tax, it is important to start looking at changes in property tax revenue at the individual state level. As our basic hypothesis is that property taxes were increased in response to reductions in state intergovernmental aid to local governments, we start by exploring some state-level data on recent changes in both property tax revenues and state aid. The evidence of Tables 1 and 2 is, for a significant minority of states, consistent with the hypothesis that state aid cuts in the recent crisis were buffered by local property tax increases.
Descriptive statistics
We next look for evidence of a possible offsetting relationship between state aid and local property tax collections for earlier years by calculating the year-to-year changes in these two variables for the 1978 to 2000 period. In Table 3 , we present the simple correlation coefficients for the state aid and property tax series. Let's first offer our a priori expectations for this correlation. In periods of normal growth when there is some positive real growth of local government spending, we might expect to see trend increases in both revenue sources and thus a positive correlation between state aid and property taxes. One source of a negative correlation is the hypothesis of this paper-that in a recession, state revenue and thus state aid goes down (or grows less) while property tax collections are more stable (or even countercyclical). Another source of a negative correlation would be an explicit or implicit swap of increased state aid for less reliance on local property taxes. Public school aid is the largest component of state aid to local governments. In response to political pressure, or judicial mandates in some cases, many states have had years in which state aid to schools has increased more than trend, allowing, or sometimes even requiring, a decrease (or below trend increase) in property tax collections.
The three largest negative correlation coefficients in Table 3 Table 3 , eleven-Arkansas, California, Georgia, Kansas, Massachusetts, Missouri, Nebraska, Oklahoma, Oregon, South Carolina, and Washingtonshowed a decrease state aid and an increase in local property taxes in the post 2000 period in Table 2 .
In the next two tables, we turn our attention to school districts and explore the recent changes in their property tax revenues and their receipt of state aid. These data come from the Public Education Finances series produced annually by the Census Bureau. In most states, school districts are independent units of government with their own access to property taxes. In a minority of states, however, some or all school districts are dependent on appropriations from a parent government for their local government share of funding. These parent governments are general purpose governments-municipalities, counties, or in the case of Hawaii, the state. For states with dependent school districts, the Census Bureau reports "parent government contributions," but does not indicate the portion of these contributions that come from the property tax. To estimate the share of the total parent government contribution coming from the property tax, we use Census of Governments data on sources of revenue by type of local government in each state. These data allow us to impute property tax revenue used to finance public education in each state with dependent school districts. Expressed as a percent of property taxes, fourteen states cut real aid per capita by more than 10 percent. In all of the twenty-nine states that cut real per capita aid, school property taxes increased over the two-year period.
Regression analysis
The descriptive statistics of Tables 1 to 5 period are presented in Table 6 .
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The variables
The dependent variable is the percentage change in total per capita local government property tax collections. In the school district regressions, the variable is defined as the percentage change in school district property tax revenues, where, as discussed above, these revenues have been estimated in states with dependent school districts.
The independent variable representing the hypothesis of property tax for aid substitution is the change in per capita state aid to local governments (or to local schools) expressed, as in column 3 of Table 3 , as a percent of property taxes per capita. Scaled in this way, the coefficient can be interpreted as the change in property taxes per dollar of change in aid and the extreme case of a dollar-for-dollar substitution would have a coefficient of negative 1.00 (see Appendix).
Per capita local government property tax revenue may change over time for a number of reasons. In choosing a set of control variables for our regression, we identified variables that the existing local public finance literature indicated were related to property tax growth. Political support for raising the property tax is probably influenced by the socioeconomic and demographic composition of local communities. The exact nature of these relationships is not very well understood. For example, there is a quite common perception that as individuals age and move into retirement, they are increasingly less willing to support the funding of local public services through the property tax. The literature on this topic is limited, and the results are mixed. 10 We entertain the possibility that states with a higher proportion of elderly will be less willing to support increases in property taxation by including as a control variable, the percentage of a state's population that was age 65 and older in 2000.
There is some limited evidence that local communities that are more socio-economically heterogeneous are less likely to support higher property taxes (to finance higher spending). We don't have state-level data on local government population heterogeneity, so as a proxy we include as a variable the state average poverty rate in 2000.
9 During the 1977 to 2000 period, three states, Michigan, New Hampshire, and Vermont, underwent major school finance reforms that resulted in a substantial shift in school funding from the local property tax to state taxes. In constructing our fiscal crisis variable for those states, we continued the trend in state tax revenue growth as if the one-time local to state revenue switch had not occurred. 10 See for example, Poterba (1997 Poterba ( , 1998 , Ladd and Murray (2001) , and Harris, Evans, and Schwab (2001) and Balsdon and Brunner (2004) .
Also, we include as a control variable a measure of the relative reliance on the local property tax in the state, property taxes as a share of local government tax revenue in 2000. Our hypothesis is that states that rely very heavily on the property tax will be less likely to increase their reliance on the property tax.
In some states, legislatively or constitutionally-imposed limits on property taxation may restrict the ability of local governments to raise property tax revenue. In a number of states, these restrictions take the form of limitations on the allowable annual increase in property tax levies. A considerable amount of research has explored the question of how effective these limits have been in reducing the level of taxation and spending. Research has provided a substantial body of evidence that the imposition of tax and limits has not only reduced spending on education, but has resulted in long-run reductions in the academic performance of public school students. 11 Based on this research it is reasonable to assume that the existence of binding property tax limitations in a state will reduce the probability that cuts in state aid will result in property tax increases. As a measure of whether a state has binding property tax limitations, we construct a dummy variable based on Anderson (2006) and more detailed descriptions of tax limitation policies generously provided to us by the author. We classify a state as having a binding property tax limitation if it imposes a limitation on property tax levies or limitation on both property tax rates and property assessments.
Results for the entire local government sector
The first column of Table 6 shows the results for all local governments combined in each state. The variable representing the hypothesized substitution between property taxes and state aid is insignificantly different from zero in the all local governments case. Our fiscal crisis measure is significant (with a t-statistic of 1.85 representing significance at the 7 percent level) and has the expected negative coefficient-the lower the fraction actual state revenue is of trendpredicted state revenue, the higher is the percentage increase in tax revenue.
None of the other control variables-change in income, percent old, percent poor, property tax share of revenue, or tax limitation-has a significant coefficient. We explored specifications with alternative control variables, but none had significant own coefficients nor a noticeable effect on the state aid coefficient; we tried the level of personal income, the change in the level of personal income, and several different measures of the severity of the fiscal crisis in the state. We also explored specifications with fewer controls, and none other than the fiscal crisis measure become significant if combinations of the other variables are omitted.
Results for school districts
With all the cross-state variation in fiscal institutions and in the timing of the crisis, and with all the differences seen in Table 2 in the bivariate relationship between property taxes and state aid, looking for an overall negative effect in all-state regressions is an ambitious undertaking. Narrowing the search to just school districts increases the probability of a significant result for a number of reasons. State aid to non-school local governments takes a variety of forms, many of which are formula-linked to population or income and not easily changed in the annual appropriation process. The state school aid appropriation is, on the other hand, one of the biggest single appropriation choices most state legislatures face each year.
The second column of Table 6 shows regression estimates with the dependent variable the percentage change in school district property taxes. The aid-change measure and property tax share control variable are correspondingly restricted to school districts. As previously explained, the state aid variable includes grants for K-12 education services that are provided by municipal or county governments and there is a corresponding assignment of property taxes to these "dependent school districts." The other statewide control variables are the same as before.
In the school district regression there is a significantly negative coefficient on the state aid variable. This is consistent with the basic hypothesis of this paper, that there was a substitution of local property tax increases to offset cuts in aid to local governments that states made when their own revenues fell sharply at the beginning of this decade. The point estimate of the coefficient on the change in per capita state aid as a percent of property taxes suggests that school districts were able to offset about 37 cents of each dollar of aid cut with increases in property taxes (with a standard error of 11 cents). None of the control variables in the school district regression is significant in the specification shown or any of the alternatives attempted.
Conclusion
There is little debate that by historical standards most states endured a serious fiscal crisis at the beginning of this decade caused in large part by large declines in state tax revenues. The response in many states to the resulting large budgetary shortfalls was to cut state financial aid to local governments in general and to school districts in particular. The objective of this paper is to explore in a systematic manner the extent to which local governments responded to these cuts in state aid by raising property taxes. We ask whether the property tax played an important countercyclical role that enabled local governments to maintain their existing levels of public service provision throughout the state fiscal crisis.
The descriptive data presented in this paper indicates that indeed, in a number of states, institutions across states always makes it difficult to explain fiscal differences among the 50 states using multivariate statistical techniques, in this paper, we make such an attempt using a fairly simple regression model to explain changes in per capita property tax revenues. Our goal is to explore whether we can find a systematic relationship between reductions in state intergovernmental aid and increases in property tax revenues, while controlling for other factors that might explain property tax changes.
When we look at the local government sector as a whole-combining municipalities, counties, school districts, special districts and all other types-we are largely unsuccessful in explaining the variation in changes in per capita property tax revenues across the states. The only explanatory variable that is even marginally significant is a measure of the severity of the fiscal crisis in each state. When we restrict our analysis to school districts, however, we find a statistically significantly negative relationship between changes in property taxes and changes in state add. We find that on average local school districts increased property taxes on the order of 37 cents for each one dollar cut in state aid. None of the other explanatory variables were statistically significant.
One interpretation of our school district regression results is that it provides strong evidence of the strength and resiliency of the property tax. Economists, in general, trumpet the benefits of the property tax (McGuire, 2001) . They point out that as a source of revenue for local governments, it is generally superior to alternative taxes, especially in terms of allocative efficiency. Our results highlight the fact that the property tax plays an important role in maintaining the stability of the state and local sector. Not only is the local property tax base much more stable with respect to cyclical influences than the bases of the state income or sales tax, but local property tax rates appear to be, in most states, sufficiently flexible so that local property tax revenues can be varied so as to provide a counter-cyclical buffer to changes in state aid. In essence, our results seem to reinforce that conclusion that the local property tax plays a critical role in our federal system.
A somewhat alternative interpretation of our results focuses on the responses to the real increases in per capita property tax revenue over the past few years. It is no secret that the property tax is a very unpopular tax among the public. Although there is a long history of efforts to reduce reliance on the property tax, the recent increases in property tax revenue appear to have ignited efforts in a number of states to further restrict use of the property tax. A number of states have either adopted or are considering limits to increases in property tax assessments (see, for example, Dye, McMillen and Merriman, 2006) . Aside from their distributional impacts, these assessment limits destroy one of the cornerstones of the property tax, namely the fact that one's property tax liability bears a direct relationship to the value of one's property wealth.
Our empirical results provide some evidence that the fiscal crisis-induced cuts in state school aid resulted in higher property taxes. If these property tax increases lead to a new round of property tax limits around the country, the counter-cyclical role played by the property tax that we have attempted to highlight in this paper, may well be seriously diminished the next time state governments face fiscal crises. The consequences for public education could be severe.
APPENDIX Measuring Changes in Aid Relative to Property Taxes
There is wide variation across states in fiscal institutions and in particular the relative importance of property taxes and aid from the state in local government budgets.
Let, R = P + A + E. Where, R = total local revenue; P = property tax revenue; A = intergovernmental aid revenue from state; and E = everything else (with all variable measured per capita).
From Table 1 , we observe that the ratio of state aid to property taxes (A/P) in 2000 ranges from about 5 to 1 in Arkansas and New Mexico to ½ to 1 in Rhode Island, New Jersey, and Maine.
To scale for these differences and to make it easier to interpret the aid coefficients of our regressions, we measure the change in aid as a percent of beginning-of-period property tax revenue (∆A/P) rather than the more obvious alternative of using beginning of period state aid in the denominator (∆A/A).
Suppose that the strongest version of the "substitution of increased taxes for decreased aid" hypothesis is correct and the absolute amount of the change in state-source A is exactly offset by a change in local-source P (i.e., ∆A = -∆P) after appropriate controls. Let's examine the difference between two specifications of the aid change variable:
(1) ∆P/P = a + b ∆A/A + c Controls + e or, .071/-.071 = -1.00 .167/-.167 = -1.00
The two states have identical and offsetting absolute changes in aid (-5) and property taxes (+5), but different initial shares of aid (30 versus 70). In the problematic specification 1, this results in very different contributions to the estimated coefficient "b". In our preferred specification 2, the re-weighting of the aid-change measure results in the same coefficient "g" of -1.00 in both states.
By using ∆A/P we have, in effect, multiplied ∆A/A times A/P to adjust for cross-state differences in the relative importance of A and P. The result is an easier to interpret coefficient:
absolutely offsetting changes have a coefficient of -1.00, negative coefficients between zero and one represent the fraction of aid changes offset by property tax changes. 0% 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 
